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Abstract. By expanding the connection of objects to the Internet and
their entry to human life, the issue of security and privacy has become
important. In order to enhance security and privacy on the Internet,
many security protocols have been developed. Unfortunately, the security
analyzes that have been carried out on these protocols show that they
are vulnerable to one or few attacks, which eliminates the use of these
protocols. Therefore, the need for a security protocol on the Internet of
Things (IoT) has not yet been resolved.
Recently, Khor and Sidorov cryptanalyzed the Wang et al. protocol and
presented an improved version of it. In this paper, at first, we show
that this protocol also does not have sufficient security and so it is not
recommended to be used in any application. More precisely, we present
a full secret disclosure attack against this protocol, which extracted the
whole secrets of the protocol by two communication with the target tag.
In addition, Sidorv et al. recently proposed an ultralightweight mutual
authentication RFID protocol for blockchain enabled supply chains, sup-
ported by formal and informal security proofs. However, we present a full
secret disclosure attack against this protocol as well.
Keywords: Internet of Things (IoT), Authentication, Secret Disclosure
Attack.
1 Introduction
Internet of Things (IoT) can be used to control all devices through an Internet
connection. IoT covers a wide range of applications at large and small scale.
One of the solutions for implementing the IoT is the use of Radio Frequency
Identification (RFID) which allows the connection of various objects via the
Internet.
Internet technology uses objects in a variety of contexts and, given the avail-
ability of security and privacy, has the ability to make things easy for humans.
One of the most fascinating things about the IoT is its ability to smart homes,
smart cities, use it in wearable gadgets and also use it in cars. Wearable gadgets
include a series of sensors and use special software to collect their users’ data;
these gadgets ultimately analyze aggregated data such as health, fitness, and the
like, and report the results to the user. The IoT can also make cars, with the
help of special sensors and of course the Internet, both increase their safety and
the optimal performance of internal components and passengers’ safety.
One of the main issues that has always been raised about the IoT is its secu-
rity issue. Since this technology connects a lot of devices through the Internet,
hacking them can have irreparable losses, such as losing sensitive personal and
economic information. One reason for this is that either security protocols have
not been used to secure IoT or that protocols have not been adequately se-
cured. Therefore, a researchers’ challenge in this field is to ensure users’ privacy
and the confidentially of their information by developing suitable software and
hardware, to be used in Internet-based products. On the other hand, the use of
security mechanisms is one of the main prerequisites for protecting the privacy
and confidentiality of a variety of applications, and IoT is not an exception.
1.1 Related Work and Motivation
A factor that can help expand the IoT is to create confidence for users of this
technology in terms of maintaining their privacy and security, because if there
is no proper security in its infrastructure, damage to IoT-based equipment, the
possibility of losing personal information, the loss of privacy, and even the dis-
closure of economic and other data, are highly likely, and this may lead to the
inability to use it in critical applications. Ronen and Shamir in [15] pointed out
that if security is not taken into account in the IoT-based infrastructure, the
technology will threaten the future of the world as a nuclear bomb.
Reviewing the proposed mechanisms and designing new models that are com-
patible with IoT-based devices are also very important. Given that an IoT system
can include many objects with limited resources, it requires special protocols to
ensure that privacy and security are guaranteed. Therefore, with the further de-
velopment of IoT, its security concerns are expected to receive more attention.
So far, several security protocols have been proposed to ensure IoT security,
e.g. [11,24,28,8,22], however, most of them have failed in providing their security
goals [14,27,29,1,21,6] and various attacks, such as the protocol’s secret values
disclosure, DoS, traceability, impersonation and etc. were reported against them.
The presentation of these attacks resulted in the development of the protocol’s
designing knowledge and the protocol designers are designing their protocols in
such a way as to be as safe as the published attacks so far. Unfortunately, there
are still attacks against newly designed protocols, and this science has not yet
matured.
Among different designing strategies of security protocols, attempts to de-
sign a secure ultralightweight protocol for constrained environment has a long
(unsuccessful) history. Pioneer examples include SASI [7], RAPP [26], SLAP [10],
LMAP [12] and R2AP [30] and among the recent proposals is SecLAP [2], and many
other broken protocols that have been compromised by the later third parties
analysis [4,3,13,17,20,18,5,16]. All those protocols tried to provide enough secu-
rity only using few lightweight operations such as bitwise operations, e.g. logical
AND, OR, XOR and rotation. However, the mentioned analysis have shown that
it is not easy to design a strong protocol using cryptographically-weak compo-
nents.
In the line of designing ultralightweight protocols, in [25], Tewari and Gupta
proposed a new ultralightweight authentication protocol for IoT and claimed
that their protocol satisfies all security requirements. However, in [18], an effi-
cient passive secret disclosure attack is applied to this protocol. Moreover, in [27],
Wang et al. cryptanalyzed the Tewari and Gupta protocol and also proposed an
improved version of it. This protocol later analysed by Khor and Sidorov [9],
where they also proposed an improved protocol following the same designing
paradigm. In this paper, we consider the security of this improved protocol
which has been proposed by Khor and Sidorov, and for simplicity, we call it
KSP (stands for Khor and Sidorov protocol) and show that KSP is vulnerable to
desynchronization attack and also against secret disclosure attack.
As a new emerging technology, blockchain is believed to provide higher data
protection, reliability, transparency, and lower management costs compared to
a conventional centralized database. Hence, it could be a promising solution for
large scale IoT systems. Targeting those benefits Sidorov et al. recently proposed
an ultralightweight mutual authentication RFID protocol for blockchain-enabled
supply chains [23]. Although they have claimed security against various attacks,
we present an efficient secret disclosure attack on it. For the sake of simplicity,
we call this protocol SOVNOKP.
1.2 Paper organization
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 is dedicated to a brief
review of KSP and SOVNOKP which are among recent proposals to provide security
in the IoT environment. Our proposed secret disclosure attacks are applied to
these protocols in Section 3. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section 4.
2 Description of KSP and SOVNOKP
To describe we use the notations that are represented in Table 1. These notations
are also used through the other parts of the paper.
2.1 KSP
Tewari and Gupta recently [25] proposed an ultra-lightweight authentication
protocol for IoT environment. Soon after that, two analyzes were published on
it [18,?]. In one of them, i.e. [?], Wang et al. presented a secret disclosure attack
that reveals the shared secret key between the server and the tag. To overcome
this security flaw, they suggested the modifications on the protocol in such a
way that it is expected to be secure against that attack. However, later Khor
Table 1. Notations used in the protocols’ description
Notations Description
T An RFID tag
R An RFID Reader
A The Adversary
IDS The pseudonyms of the tag
ID The identifier of the tag
K The tag’s key
m,n, q and r The random numbers which are gener-
ated by the reader/tag
Xi The i
th bit of string X
E(M,K) The encryption function which encrypts
M using K as its key
wt(Y ) The Hamming weight of Y which equals
with the number of 1s in Y
Rot(X,Y ) The left rotation of X by amount of Y
mod L, where L is the bit-length of X
RRot(X,Y ) The right rotation of X by amount of
Y mod L, where L is the bit-length of
X
⊕ The bit wise exclusive-or operation
h(.) SHA-256 hash function
and Sidorov [9] have shown that Wang et al.’s protocol is as insecure as its
predecessor and also proposed a new improved protocol which we call it KSP. As
it is shown in Fig. 1, following the notations represented in Table 1, KSP runs
as follows:
1. The reader starts the authentication phase of the protocol by sending Hello
and a random number r message to the tag.
2. The tag, when receives the message, generates a random number q and com-
putes s = Rot(q ⊕ r, wt(q)), T = IDSnew ⊕ r ⊕ q and U = Rot(IDSold ⊕
IDSnew, wt(q)) and sends s‖T ‖U to the reader.
3. Upon receipt of the message, the reader does as follows:
– It does an exhaustive search to find wt(q) to find a record of its database
that satisfies the received s and T , where the reader will be able to find
IDSold also, given U , to authenticate the tag.
– The reader generates two new random numbers m and n and com-
putes P = m ⊕ n ⊕ q, Q = Rot(n,wt(Knew)) and R = Rot(Rot(K ⊕
m,wt(n)), wt(K ⊕m)) and sends them to the tag.
4. Once the tag receives the message, it:
– Extracts n and m and verifies the messages integrity based on R to
authenticate the reader.
– If the reader has been authenticated, the tag and the reader will update
their new parameters IDSnew = Rot(IDSnew⊕q, wt(n))⊕Rot(q, wt(m))
and Knew = Rot(Knew ⊕ q ⊕ n,wt(m)) ⊕Rot(m,wt(n)).
Reader Rj Tag Tr
IDSold, Kold,IDSnew,Knew IDSold,Kold ,IDSnew, Knew
Generates r
Hello,r
−−−−−−−−−−→ Generates q, Computes s = Rot(q ⊕
r, wt(q)), T = IDSnew ⊕ r ⊕ q and
U = Rot(IDSold ⊕ IDSnew,wt(q))
Extracts tag’s records; Authenti-
cates the tag, Generates m and
n; Computes P = m ⊕ n ⊕ q,
Q = Rot(n,wt(Knew)) and R =
Rot(Rot(K ⊕m,wt(n)), wt(K⊕m));
Updates parameters.
s‖T‖U
←−−−−−−−−−−−
P‖Q‖R
−−−−−−−−→ Extracts m and n; Authenticates the
reader; Updates parameters.
IDSold = IDSnew IDS
old = IDSnew
Kold = Knew K
old = Knew
IDSnew = Rot(IDSnew ⊕
q, wt(n)) ⊕ Rot(q, wt(m))
IDSnew = Rot(IDSnew ⊕
q, wt(n)) ⊕ Rot(q, wt(m))
Knew = Rot(Knew⊕q⊕n,wt(m))⊕
Rot(m, wt(n))
Knew = Rot(Knew⊕q⊕n,wt(m))⊕
Rot(m, wt(n))
Fig. 1. Mutual authentication phase of KSP [9]
2.2 SOVNOKP
SOVNOKP protocol [23]follows the KSP protocol designing paradigm and it is based
on almost similar components. As it is shown in Fig. 2, following the notations
represented in Table 1, SOVNOKP runs as follows:
1. The reader starts the authentication phase of the protocol by sending Hello
and a random number r message to the tag.
2. The tag, when receives the message, generates a random number q and com-
putes A = Rot(IDS⊕r, wt(q)), and B = Rot(IDS,wt(r))⊕Rot(K⊕r, wt(q))
and sends A‖B to the reader.
3. Upon receipt of the message, the reader forwards r‖A‖B to the supply chain
node.
4. Upon receipt of r‖A‖B , the reader does as follows:
– It does an exhaustive search to find wt(q) to find a record of its database
that satisfies the received A, where the reader will be able to find IDS
and K to verify the received B to authenticate the tag.
– Based on the h(IDS‖K), it can check and track the product history
together with permission level by reading the data from the blockchain. If
the product has a correct history record in terms of ownership, timestamp,
location, and product status, the supply chain node can authenticate the
tag.
– Once the tag has been authorized, the supply chain node generates
a random number m and computes C = Rot(r, wt(IDS) ⊕ wt(K)) ⊕
Rot(m,wt(K)), and D = Rot(m,wt(IDS)) ⊕ Rot(r, wt(K)) and sends
C‖D to the reader.
5. The reader forwards the received C‖D to the tag.
6. Once the tag receives the message, it:
– Extracts m from C and verifies the messages integrity based on D to
authenticate the reader/supply chain node.
– If the reader/supply chain node has been authenticated and wt(m) is
even, the tag will update its parameters as: IDSnew = Rot(IDS ⊕
K,wt(r)) ⊕ Rot(K ⊕ wt(q), wt(IDS)) and Knew = Rot(K,wt(r)) ⊕
Rot(r ⊕ q, wt(K)).
3 Security analysis of KSP and SOVNOKP
Although the designers of KSP and SOVNOKP argued its security formally using
GNY logic, however, it is easy to show that they are as vulnerable to different
attacks as their predecessor rotation based protocols, e.g. see [19].
3.1 Secret Disclosure Attack on KSP
To analyze KSP, we follow the same adversarymodel as them, when they analyzed
Wang et al.’s protocol [9, Sec.II, page 92], where “adversary is able to eavesdrop,
intercept, block, and modify messages sent during communication between the
reader and a tag.”. Given the target tag, the attack procedure will be as follows:
Supply chain node Reader Tag
IDSold,Kold,IDSnew IDSold,Kold ,IDSnew
, Knew ,Knew
Generates r
Hello,r
−−−−−−−−−−→ Generates q, Computes A =
Rot(IDS ⊕ r, wt(q)), and
B = Rot(IDS, wt(r)) ⊕
Rot(K ⊕ q, wt(q))
Extracts tag’s records;
Authenticates the tag, Gen-
erates m; Computes C =
Rot(r, wt(IDS)⊕wt(K)) ⊕
Rot(m, wt(K)), and
D = Rot(m, wt(IDS)) ⊕
Rot(r, wt(K)) and sends
C‖D; Updates parameters.
r‖A‖B
←−−−−−−−−−−−
A‖B
←−−−−−−−−−
C‖D
−−−−−→
C‖D
−−−−−→ Extracts m; Authenticates
the reader/supply chain
node; Updates parameters.
IDSnew = Rot(IDS ⊕
K, wt(r)) ⊕ Rot(K ⊕
wt(q), wt(IDS)) and
Knew = Rot(K, wt(r)) ⊕
Rot(r ⊕ q, wt(K))
IDSnew = Rot(IDS ⊕
K,wt(r)) ⊕ Rot(K ⊕
wt(q), wt(IDS)) and
Knew = Rot(K, wt(r)) ⊕
Rot(r ⊕ q, wt(K))
Fig. 2. Mutual authentication phase of SOVNOKP [23]
1. The adversary eavesdrops a session of the protocol between the target tag
and a legitimate reader, where, the reader generates an arbitrary nonce r
and sends it to the tag, along with Hello.
2. The tag, when receives the message, generates a random number q and com-
putes s = Rot(q ⊕ r, wt(q)), T = IDSnew ⊕ r ⊕ q and U = Rot(IDSold ⊕
IDSnew, wt(q)) and sends s‖T ‖U to the reader, which is eavesdropped by
the adversary.
3. Upon receipt of the message, the reader does as follows:
– It does an exhaustive search to find wt(q) to find a record of its database
that satisfies the received s and T , where the reader will be able to find
IDSold also, given U , to authenticate the tag.
– The reader generates two new random numbers m and n and com-
putes P = m ⊕ n ⊕ q, Q = Rot(n,wt(Knew)) and R = Rot(Rot(K ⊕
m,wt(n)), wt(K⊕m)) and sends them to the tag, which is eavesdropped
by the adversary.
4. The adversary terminates the protocol.
5. Given that tag has not received P‖Q‖R, it will not update its records, i.e.
IDSnew, Knew, IDSold and Kold.
6. The adversary waits for another session between the target tag and a legiti-
mate reader, where, the reader generates an arbitrary nonce r′ and sends it
to the tag, along with Hello.
7. The tag, when receives the message, generates a random number q′ and
computes s′ = Rot(q′ ⊕ r′, wt(q′)), T ′ = IDSnew ⊕ r
′ ⊕ q′ and U ′ =
Rot(IDSold ⊕ IDSnew, wt(q
′)) and sends s′‖T ′‖U ′ to the reader, which is
eavesdropped by the adversary.
8. Upon receipt of the message, the reader does as follows:
– It does an exhaustive search to find wt(q′) to find a record of its database
that satisfies the received s′ and T ′, where the reader will be able to find
IDSold also, given U
′, to authenticate the tag.
– The reader generates two new random numbers m′ and n′ and computes
P ′ = m′ ⊕ n′ ⊕ q′, Q′ = Rot(n′, wt(Knew)) and R
′ = Rot(Rot(K ⊕
m′, wt(n′)), wt(K ⊕ m′)) and sends them to the tag, which is eaves-
dropped by the adversary.
9. Given that T ⊕T ′ = q⊕r⊕q′⊕r′, the adversary finds two offset values c and
c′, respectively as wt(q) and wt(q′), such that and RRot(s, c)⊕RRot(s′, c′) =
T ⊕ T ′ and assigns RRot(s, c) to q ⊕ r and RRot(s′, c′) to q′ ⊕ r′.
10. The adversary now extracts IDSnew = T ⊕ RRot(s, c), q = RRot(s, c) ⊕ r
and IDSold = IDSnew ⊕RRot(U,wt(q)).
11. The adversary finds three offset values c1, c2 and c3, respectively as wt(Knew),
wt(n)+wt(Knew⊕m) and wt(n
′)+wt(Knew⊕m
′), such that and P ⊕P ′⊕
q ⊕ q′ = RRot(Q, c1)⊕RRot(Q
′, c2)⊕RRot(R, c2)⊕RRot(R
′, c3).
12. The adversary assignsRRot(Q, c1),RRot(Q
′, c2), RRot(R, c2) and RRot(R
′, c3)
respectively to n, n′, K ⊕m and K ⊕m′.
13. The adversary extracts m = P ⊕RRot(Q, c1)⊕ q and K = RRot(R, c2)⊕m.
Following above attack, the adversary extracts whole shared parameters between
the tag and the reader with the complexity of eavesdropping two sessions of the
protocol, blocking a message and doing polynomial computations. It is clear that
T ⊕T = q⊕ r⊕ q′⊕ r′. Now the adversary can also compute the updated values
of IDSnew and Knew as IDSnew = Rot(IDSnew⊕q, wt(n))⊕Rot(q, wt(m)) and
Knew = Rot(Knew ⊕ q ⊕ n,wt(m)) ⊕Rot(m,wt(n)).
Remark 1. : It should be noted the adversary can use other metrics to filter pos-
sible wrong guesses, e.g., c1, c2 and c3 should be respectively equal to wt(Knew),
wt(n) + wt(Knew ⊕m) and wt(n
′) + wt(Knew ⊕m
′).
Given that the adversary has whole secret parameters, applying any other attack
will be trivial, e.g., reader/tag impersonation, desynchronization and traceability
attacks.
3.2 Secret Disclosure Attack on SOVNOKP
To analyze SOVNOKP, we follow the same adversary model as them, when they
analyzed Wang et al.’s protocol [23, Sec.IV, page 9], where “ adversary has the
capability to initiate communication with the reader and a tag and it is able
to eavesdrop, intercept, block, and modify messages sent during communication
between the reader and a tag. Moreover, the number of unsuccessful attempts
is limited to 5, otherwise, the reader sends KILL command to the tag ”. The
parameter length is considered to be 96 bits. Given the target tag, the attack
procedure, which is almost similar to the attack against KSP, will be as follows:
1. The adversary eavesdrops all transferred messages over a session of the pro-
tocol between the target tag and a legitimate reader, i.e., r, A,B,C,D where,
A = Rot(IDS ⊕ r, wt(q)), B = Rot(IDS,wt(r)) ⊕ Rot(K ⊕ q, wt(q)), C =
Rot(r, wt(IDS) ⊕ wt(K)) ⊕ Rot(m,wt(K)), and D = Rot(m,wt(IDS)) ⊕
Rot(r, wt(K)).
2. The adversary blocks C‖D, sent from the reader to the tag. Hence, tag will
not update its secrets, i.e., IDS and K.
3. The adversary waits for another session between the the target tag and a
legitimate reader, where, the reader generates an arbitrary nonce r′ and
sends it to the tag, along with Hello.
4. The adversary again eavesdrops all transferred messages over a session of the
protocol between the target tag and a legitimate reader, i.e., r′, A′, B′, C′, D′
where, A′ = Rot(IDS ⊕ r′, wt(q′)), B′ = Rot(IDS,wt(r′)) ⊕ Rot(K ⊕
q′, wt(q′)), C′ = Rot(r′, wt(IDS) ⊕ wt(K)) ⊕ Rot(m′, wt(K)), and D′ =
Rot(m′, wt(IDS))⊕Rot(r′, wt(K)).
5. Given that RRot(A,wt(q))⊕RRot(A′, wt(q′)) = IDS⊕r⊕IDS⊕r′ = r⊕r′
and r and r′ are transferred over insecure channel, which is eavesdropped by
the adversary, the adversary extracts IDS and K as follows:
(a) for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 95}
(b) for j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 95}
(c) if RRot(A, i) ⊕ RRot(A′, j) == r ⊕ r′, return RRot(A, i) ⊕ r, i and j
respectively as IDS, wt(q) and wt(q′).
6. Given r, r′, IDS, wt(q) and wt(q′), the adversary extracts K as RRot((B⊕
Rot(IDS,wt(r))), wt(q)) ⊕ r.
7. The adversary can use other metrics to filter possible wrong guesses, e.g.,
B′, C, C′, D and D′.
8. The adversary calculates the updated parameters as IDSnew = Rot(IDS ⊕
K,wt(r′))⊕Rot(K⊕wt(q′), wt(IDS)) andKnew = Rot(K,wt(r
′))⊕Rot(r′⊕
q′, wt(K))
Following above attack, the adversary extracts whole shared parameters between
the tag and the reader with the complexity of eavesdropping two sessions of the
protocol, blocking a message and doing polynomial computations. In this case
also, since the adversary has whole secret parameters, applying any other attack
will be trivial, e.g., reader/tag impersonation, desynchronization and traceability
attacks.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown that two recent proposed security protocols for
IoT and RFID systems (i.e. KSP and SOVNOKP ) are vulnerable against secret dis-
closure attacks, were we presented attacks with the complexity of eavesdropping
only two sessions of each protocol and negligible computational complexity.
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